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Abstract: In this work, a novel chaos-based stream cipher based on a skew tent map is proposed and
implemented in a 0.18 µm CMOS (Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor) technology. The
proposed ciphering algorithm uses a linear feedback shift register that perturbs the orbits generated
by the skew tent map after each iteration. This way, the randomness of the generated sequences
is considerably improved. The implemented stream cipher was capable of achieving encryption
speeds of 1 Gbps by using an approximate area of ∼ 20, 000 2-NAND equivalent gates, with a power
consumption of 24.1 mW. To test the security of the proposed cipher, the generated keystreams were
subjected to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) randomness tests, proving that
they were undistinguishable from truly random sequences. Finally, other security aspects such as the
key sensitivity, key space size, and security against reconstruction attacks were studied, proving that
the stream cipher is secure.
Keywords: stream cipher; PRNG; cryptography; chaotic map; skew tent map
1. Introduction
Despite the large number of encryption algorithms proposed in previous decades, there is still a
great interest in the field of cryptography [1,2]. This is mainly for two reasons: first, due to the growth
of computer processing power as well as developments in the field of cryptanalysis, many of the
previously proposed algorithms are currently considered to be insecure; second, new applications that
require specific constraints such as low power consumption can require specific encryption algorithms.
Usually, in applications where a high encryption speed is needed, stream ciphers are a suitable
option [3]. In these systems, the sender uses an initial seed (key) to generate a pseudo-random sequence
called a keystream. The ciphertext is then obtained by combining each bit of the plaintext with its
corresponding bit of the keystream (Figure 1). To decrypt the message, the receiver must use the
exact same key to generate an identical keystream. By applying the inverse combining operation, the
original plaintext can be recovered. Usually, an XOR (Exclusive Or) operation is used for the combining
operation and the inverse combining operation. The main advantage of stream ciphers against block
ciphers is that since they encrypt each bit individually, they do not need to store blocks of data, or
add extra bits to complete blocks (padding bits). Therefore, they usually have less-stringent memory
requirements and can achieve higher encryption speeds.
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Figure 1. Generic scheme of a stream cipher composed by a PRNG (Pseudo-Random Number Generator)
and an XOR gate. An internal state is constantly getting updated using a fee back function. This
way, each value of the internal state is obtained as a function of the previous value and key. The
final keystream is obtained from the internal states using an output function. Finally, the ciphertext is
generated by XORing the plaintext with the keystream.
Typically, there are three parameters that must be taken into account when designing a secure
encryption system: encryption speed, security, and implementation cost [4]. While is it relatively easy
to design a secure but slow cipher, or to design a secure but area- and power-hungry cipher, it can
be very challenging to design an encryption algorithm that is fast, secure, low-power, and easy to
implement. In this context, chaos-based stream ciphers have emerged in the past decade as a suitable
alternative, capable of achieving a good balance between all these three parameters [5].
The idea behind chaos-based stream ciphers is that chaotic systems present some intrinsic
properties such as random-like behavior and ergodicity that are closely related with the properties of
confusion and diffusion [6] that any cryptosystem should present in order to be considered secure [7].
Usually, a common approach used in chaos-based stream ciphers consists of using an algorithm based
on a chaotic map of the form xi+1 = f (xi, Γ). In these kinds of maps, starting with an initial state, x0,
and one or several control parameters, Γ =
{
γ1,γ2, . . .
}
, a sequence of elements {xi} is generated using a
feedback function f . To use this map as a stream cipher, it is digitized and one or several bits of each
state is used to form the keystream. The control parameter Γ as well as the initial state x0 form the key
that must be shared by both the transmitter and the receiver to encrypt and decrypt the messages.
Among the possible maps, most of the recently proposed algorithms are based on logistic
maps [8–11], but other maps such as the Rényi map [12], the Lorenz’s attractor [13], the skew tent
map [14], or higher-dimensional chaotic systems have been used [15]. Unfortunately, in most of these
maps there are some initial values for which the output sequences are periodic and therefore unsuitable
for being used to generate secure keystreams. In these cases, the exact parameters that lead to periodic
windows are often unknown [16,17], so it can be very challenging to design a key-generation process
that guarantees that all the generated keys are secure (i.e., they lead to a chaotic behavior). On the other
hand, when a chaotic system is digitized it suffers a degradation in its dynamics due to truncation or
round-off errors and, as a consequence, the generated orbits become periodic (i.e., non-secure) [18–20].
This effect has been widely studied, and although increasing the precision used in the digitation can
mitigate this effect, it also needs much more area to be implemented [21].
In this work, a chaos-based stream cipher is proposed and implemented in an application-specific
integrated circuit (ASIC). Its encryption algorithm is based on a skew tent map (STM) but uses a linear
feedback shift register (LFSR) to increase the randomness of the generated sequences. The proposed
cipher was implemented in a 0.18-µm CMOS process and was capable of achieving an encryption
speed of 1 Gbps using an approximate area of ∼ 20, 000 2-NAND equivalent gates, with a power
consumption of 24.1 mW. To prove the security of the proposed algorithm, several aspects such as
Electronics 2019, 8, 623 3 of 10
the key sensitivity, key space size, robustness against reconstruction attacks, and randomness of the
generated sequences were analyzed.
As a result, we proved that the proposed stream cipher is secure and could be suitable for
applications that require the secure transmission of confidential information at a speed of up to 1 Gbps.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the proposed stream cipher in detail;
Section 3 shows the ASIC implementation results of this proposal; Section 4 presents a comprehensive
cryptanalysis of the stream cipher; finally, the main conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Proposed Stream Cipher
2.1. Skew Tent Map
The skew tent map (STM) is a one-dimensional chaotic map with a single control parameter γ
defined by the following equations:
f (xi) = xi+1 =
{
xi/γ xi ∈ [0,γ],
(1− xi)/(1− γ) xi ∈ (γ, 1], (1)
where x0,γ ∈ (0, 1). The main advantage of this map is that, due to its simplicity, it can be easily
implemented. Furthermore, it has been proven that, for all values of x0 and γ, the behavior of this map
is chaotic (i.e., it does not present periodic windows) [22]. Therefore, it is a very good candidate for use
in chaos-based cryptosystems [23].
Because the STM algorithm has a division operation that can be costly to implement in hardware
but the divisors are constant for each seed, a common approach used in several works (including
this one) consists of pre-calculating the divisors (1/γ and 1/(1− γ)) and using multiplications
instead [24,25]. A block diagram of the STM can be seen in Figure 2.
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2.2. Dynamics Degradation Due to Digitization 
As explained in the Introduction, due to the digitization of a chaotic map, if the state values are 
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generated orbits are periodic. Although the maximum possible period, 𝑃௠௔௫, is 𝑃௠௔௫ = 2௡, the mean 
Figure 2. Block diagram of the skew tent map (STM) generator. Each state xi+1 is obtained as a function
of the previous state xi and the control parameter γ. For this purpose, the internal state xi is compared
to the value of γ to determine if it belongs to the [0,γ] range or to the (γ, 1] range. In each case, by using
two multiplexers, the correct factors (xi or (1− xi)) and (1/γ or 1/(1− γ)) are selected and multiplied.
2.2. Dynamics Degradation Due to Digitization
As explained in the Introduction, due to the digitization of a chaotic map, if the state values
are implemented using a precision of n bits, there is a finite number of different possible values, so
the generated orbits are periodic. Although the maximum possible period, Pmax, is Pmax = 2n, the
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mean period, P, is usually much shorter and scales as P ∼ 2n/2 [26]. Furthermore, the periods of the
generated orbits are usually much smaller than the mean period [27].
As a consequence, with the typical precisions of 32 or 64 bits, the periods of the generated
keystreams are usually too short, and therefore the keystreams can repeat themselves if the transmitted
messages are long. Another consequence of these short periods is that the generated keystreams are
usually incapable of passing randomness tests.
This effect has been widely studied, and several solutions have been proposed [28,29]. Since (as
explained in the Introduction) using a higher precision also implies using a much larger area to obtain
the same throughput [21], a different approach was used in this work.
2.3. Encryption Algorithm
To address this dynamics degradation problem, the orbits generated by the STM can be perturbed
using an LFSR. In the proposed algorithm, after each iteration, the eight least-significant bits (LSBs) of
each xi
(
x0i , x
1
i , . . . x
7
i
)
are combined with the last bits of the state of the LFSR yi with an XOR operation.
This way, the state is modified after each iteration and, this modified state (x˜i) is the one used to
generate the next state of the sequence: xi+1 = f (x˜i).
According to [30], if a sequence A(k) of period PA is XORed with a sequence B(k) of period PB,
the period of the resulting sequence, C(k) = A(k) ⊕ B(k), will be bigger than PA and PB as long as PA
and PB are coprime. Using this result, since the bits x˜ki (k = 0, 1, . . . 7)) are generated as x˜
k
i = x
k
i ⊕ yki , as
long as the period of the LFSR (PA) and the period of the sequence
{
xki
}
(PB) are coprime, the period of
the sequence
{
x˜ki
}
(PC) and, therefore the period of the sequence {xi} will be equal to or greater than PA.
In the proposed stream cipher, a 64-bit precision was used to represent the variables xi, γ, and a
61-order LFSR with a prime period 261 − 1 was used to perturb the orbits. By choosing the period of
the LFSR, PA, to be a prime number, the periods PA and PB will be coprime unless PB is a multiple of
PA. However, this case is extremely unlikely. Since PA = 261 − 1 and PB < 264, there are only eight
possible values of PB that are multiples of PA, so the chances of running into this case can be neglected.
To generate the keystreams, only the eight LSBs of each x˜i were used. This way, by using only
a small part of each state to form the keystream, its randomness is improved. Furthermore, as will
be explained in Section 4, the security against reconstruction attacks is greatly increased. The whole
scheme of the proposed stream cipher is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Scheme of the proposed stream cipher. The eight least-significant bits (LSBs) of each state,
xi, are XORed with the last 8 bits generated by a 61-order linear feedback shift register (LFSR). These
bits are the ones used to generate the keystream. On the other hand, the resulting modified state, x˜i,
obtained by recombining these eight modified bits with the 56 remaining bits is used as an input of
the STM block. This block applies the STM equations as explained in Figure 2 to generate the next
state, xi+1.
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Note that, although the possibility of combining an STM with an LFSR was advanced in [23,25],
in this work the encryption algorithm was optimized using 8 bits of the LFSR after each iteration step,
achieving better statistical properties while obtaining higher encryption speeds, as will be shown in
the next sections. Furthermore, this paper presents an ASIC implementation of the system as well as
experimental results and a comprehensive cryptanalysis.
3. Implementation Results
The proposed cipher was implemented in a 0.18-µm CMOS technology with six metal layers
provided by TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company), fed at 1.8 V (core) and 3.3 V
(I/O). Some major constraints of the design were a maximum clock period of 14 ns, load ranging
from 0.01 to 1.0 pf at outputs, and drive up to 0.4 kΩ at inputs. This set of constraints proved to be
enough for this technology to satisfactorily implement the cipher, achieving an encryption speed of
1 Gbps using a total area of 0.197 mm2 or (∼ 20, 000 2-NAND equivalent gates using an equivalence
of 10 µm per 2-NAND [31]). At the maximum frequency of operation, its power consumption was
24.1 mW, which resulted in 24.1 pJ/bit. This result is lower than typical implementations of AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard), such as the ones presented in [32] (45 pJ/bit) and [33] (30–62 pJ/bit).
The full implementation results are shown in Table 1. From these results, it can be concluded that the
implemented stream cipher is capable of achieving high encryption speeds while using a small silicon
area and presenting a low power consumption.
Table 1. Implementation results.
Parameter Value
Technology (nm) 180
Area (mm2) 0.19682
Gate equivalent (2-NAND) 19682
Maximum frequency (MHz) 125
bits/cycle 8
Maximum throughput (Gbps) 1
Throughput/gate (kbps/gate) 50.8
Power at 125 MHz (mW) 24.1
Energy/bit (pJ/bit) 24.1
These implementation results were compared with other ASIC implementations of previously
proposed chaotic stream ciphers. Since other works do not provide information about some of the
parameters in Table 1 (e.g., power consumption or area), Table 2 only focuses on 2-NAND equivalent
gates and throughput. As can be seen, the proposed algorithm performed slightly better than the
works presented in [8,9] in terms of throughput/gate and achieved higher encryption speeds. Although
a work improving the algorithm proposed in [9] was presented in [10], this result was not included in
the table since it has not been implemented.
Table 2. Comparison with other chaotic stream ciphers.
System [8] [9] This Work
Technology (µm) 0.18 0.18 0.18
Gate equivalent (2-NAND) 9622 10,218 19,682
Throughput (Gbps) 0.2 0.25 1
Throughput/gate (kbps/gate) 20.8 24.5 50.8
To check the correct functioning of the chip, the keystreams generated by different initial parameters
(x0,γ, y0) were measured and compared with the theoretical values. To set the frequencies of operation,
a Zybo board, which includes a Zynq 7000 series FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array), was used to
feed the ASIC with a clock signal at different frequencies (Figure 4). The output signals were captured
Electronics 2019, 8, 623 6 of 10
with a DSAV334A Infiniium V-Series oscilloscope and were later post-processed to extract the binary
sequence. A sample signal obtained at a clock frequency of 250 kHz is shown in Figure 5.
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We checked that the system worked properly (i.e., the generated keystreams matc ed the theoretical
ones) at all the measured frequencies up to 125 MHz, which is the maximum clock frequency that
the FPGA was capable of supplying. This way, we can assure that this stream cipher can achieve
encryption spe s of at least 1 Gbps.
4. Cryptanalysis
First, in order to be secure, the stream cipher should generate keystreams that are undistinguishable
from truly random sequences. To check that the proposed stream cipher is capable of generating
random keystreams, several keystreams of one million bits were generated and subjected to the
National Institute of Standard and Tec nology (NIST) randomness tests [34]. All of the passed th
NIST ests, proving that he generated keystreams were indeed undistinguishable from truly random
sequ ces (Figure 6a). Furthermore, we checked that if the sequences were generated o ly with the
STM (i. ., wit out the LFSR) they failed these te ts (Figure 6b). On the other hand, it i well known that
raw sequences generated by an LFSR fail the linear complexity randomness tests. Furthermore, th
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operations involved in LFSRs can be easily inverted, and thus these systems are insecure. Therefore,
we can conclude that the proposed algorithm is capable of generating keystreams with much better
statistical properties than the STM or the LFSR separately.
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In the proposed algorithm, the key size is composed of the total number of possible initial values
(x0, γ, y0). Since the precision of the digitization of x0 and γ is 64, and a 61-order LFSR was used, the
key space size in this case was κ = 264+64+61 = 2189, which is greater than the recommended value of
2112. Since a key size of 189 bits is not standard, to adapt this algorithm to some standard protocols
that use a key size of 80 or 128 bits, some of the bits of the key could be fixed. For example, the initial
state of the LFSR could be a fixed known value. This way, the key would be composed of the total
number of possible values of γ and x0, resulting in a standard key size of 128 bits.
Another important aspect of the proposed algorithm is that, because the map used in this algorithm
is chaotic, there is a high sensitivity to the key (i.e., for similar keys the output sequences are very
different). To test this property, 300 pairs of keys were used, each pair differing in only one bit (the
differing bit in each simulation was chosen randomly). With each of these pairs, a pair of 10,000 length
keystreams was generated, and in each case we counted how many bits of these keystreams were
different (i.e., how many bits of the keystreams changed when the key was slightly modified). In an
ideal stream cipher, the probability that a certain bit of the keystream is changed when the key
is modified should be P = 0.5, and therefore, 5000 out of 10, 000 bits should change in each case.
According to the binomial distribution properties, the mean µ and the standard deviation σ of these
experiments would be given by: µ = nP = 5000, σ =
√
nP(1− P) = 50. With this test, we obtained
values of µ = 4998 and σ = 51.6, which are very close to the theoretical ones. Therefore, the system
presented a high sensitivity to the key, and so it would be very difficult for an attacker to find statistical
relationships between different keystreams even if they were generated with very similar keys.
Finally, one of the possible attacks that can be effective in several chaos-based stream ciphers is
the reconstruction attack. This attack consists of trying to obtain two or more consecutive state values
at a certain time and applying Equation (1) to find the values of γ, xi, and therefore the whole sequence
{xi} as well as the output sequence. However, in the proposed algorithm, this attack is prevented by
using only a small part (the LSBs) of each state value xi to form the final keystream. Furthermore, the
presence of the LFSR considerably increases the complexity of the system so Equation (1) cannot be
used directly. Even in a worst-case scenario where the initial state of the LFSR was known (it was not
used as part of the key) and 8 bits of two consecutive states xi, xi+1 were leaked, there would still be
56 bits of xi and 56 bits of xi+1 that would remain unknown. Therefore, if an attacker wanted to use
Equation (1) to obtain the values of xi, xi+1, and γ, they would have to solve
(
256
)2
possible equations.
Therefore, even if an attacker managed to know a part of the keystream, they would not be able to
use that information to guess (in a reasonable amount of time) the state of the system (xi, γ, yi) and,
therefore, guess the whole keystream. This fact combined with the fact that the output sequences have
proven to be random, assure that this system presents forward and backward secrecy.
In summary, according to the security aspects considered in this manuscript, the proposed
algorithm is cryptographically secure. However, to guarantee the security of this cipher for use in
security-related applications, other security aspects such as the internal structure of the keystream
generator should be considered. Finally, to fully prove its security, no effective specific attacks against
this cipher should be found in the following years. For this purpose, for anyone interested in testing
the security of this algorithm, the authors will give away the code upon request.
5. Conclusions
In this paper a stream cipher based on a skew tent map (STM) and a linear feedback shift register
(LFSR) was proposed and implemented in a 0.18-µm standard CMOS technology. The proposed cipher
achieved an encryption rate of 1 Gbps using a low area and low power consumption.
The security of the proposed algorithm was analyzed, focusing on different aspects such as the
randomness of the generated sequences, the key size, the sensitivity to the key, and the security against
reconstruction attacks. With this study, we concluded that the proposed stream cipher is secure against
all these attacks.
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Therefore, the proposed stream cipher is suitable for use in applications (including
cryptography-related ones) that need to generate pseudo-random numbers at a high speed (up
to 1 Gbps).
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